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GUNS AND MEMBERSHIP IN THE AMERICAN POLITY
Pratheepan Gulasekaram*
INTRODUCTION
The gun is mythic in the American imagination. James Madison extolled its
transformative and signifying powers when he argued in the Federalist Papers that
“the advantage of being armed” is a characteristic that “Americans possess over the
people of almost every other nation.”1 This “advantage,” in the hands of militiamen,
has provided the foundation for our nation’s creation stories,2 but it has also been
the catalyst for some of our nation’s most inexplicable tragedies.3 Vacillating be
* Assistant Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law (J.D., Stanford Law School).
Thanks to the editors of the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal and their 2012 sympo-
sium on Noncitizen Participation in the American Polity for the opportunity to present the
ideas included in this Article. This Article is my third in a series exploring the relationship
between the Second Amendment and noncitizens. For my prior scholarship on this issue,
please see “The People” of the Second Amendment: Citizenship and the Right to Bear Arms,
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521 (2010) and Aliens with Guns: Equal Protection, Federal Power, and
the Second Amendment, 92 IOWA L. REV. 891 (2007).
1 THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 296 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
2 See Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early American
Origins of Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 492 (2004) (“Historians have long recog-
nized that the Second Amendment was strongly connected to the republican ideologies of the
Founding Era, particularly the notion of civic virtue.”).
3 See, e.g., THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN AND THE TRIAL OF THE CONSPIR-
ATORS 17–21 (Benn Pitman ed., 1865) (discussing the assassination of President Abraham
Lincoln); REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
KENNEDY 18–25 (1964), available at http://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission
-report/chapter-1.html (summarizing the commission’s findings relating to the John F. Kennedy
assassination); Peter J. Boyer, The Children of Waco, THE NEW YORKER, May 15, 1995, at
38, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/waco/childrenofwaco1.html (dis-
cussing reflections on the Waco Massacre and the legacy left behind); Emma Goldman,
Editorial, The Tragedy at Buffalo, FREE SOC., Oct. 1901, available at http://ublib.buffalo.edu
/libraries/exhibits/panam/law/images/tragedyatbuff.html (reflecting upon the assassination
of President McKinley); Evan Thomas, The Worst Week, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 10, 2007, at 44,
46, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/69542/page/3 (telling the story of Martin Luther
King Jr.’s assassination); Gordon Witkin, The Nightmare of Idaho’s Ruby Ridge, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Sept. 3, 1995, at 24, available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news
/articles/950911/archive_032768.htm (discussing the violent firefight between Randy Weaver
and federal agents, the events leading up to it, and its aftermath); The Man Who Loved
Kennedy, TIME, Feb. 21, 1969, at 18, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article
/0,9171,838974,00.html (recounting the opening days of Sir-ban Bishara Sirhan’s trial for
the assassination of Robert F. Kennedy); Michael Perry, Massacre Sparks Foreign Criticism
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tween these poles of heroism and heartbreak, firearms have remained at the center of
the nation’s political, legal, and historical consciousness. All along, one aspect of
Madison’s contention perseveres: the gun—its availability to the civilian population,4
its use for both public and private ends,5 and the violence associated with it6—has
steadfastly remained uniquely American.7
Access to, and use of, firearms has helped define ideas of membership in
America. The gun played a vital role in the genesis tales of the Republic itself. It
was a bullet fired into a British officer by a militia man in Lexington, Massachusetts
on April 19, 1775, that is credited with igniting the war for independence;8 it was
the gun that helped tame the wilderness and battle American Indians in stories of the
expanding nineteenth-century frontier;9 and firearms were credited with shoring up
the struggle for political and racial equality during Reconstruction after the Civil
War.10 In all of these manifestations—as a tool of resistance to tyranny, an instrument
of imperialism, a method of survival and self-protection, and a pathway to political
inclusion—the gun facilitated formation of, and inclusion in, the American polity.
Concomitantly, however, the gun has also demarcated the borders of exclusion
as well. Despite a thriving firearms trade with Indians,11 several colonial and early
state laws reflected discomfort with the idea of arming them, sometimes forbidding
of U.S. Gun Culture, REUTERS (Apr. 17, 2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews
/idUSL1752333820070417 (describing the Virginia Tech shooting as the deadliest shooting
in the nation’s history).
4 Factbox: Guns and Gun Ownership in the United States, REUTERS (Apr. 17, 2007), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2007/04/17/us-usa-crime-shootings-guns-idUSN1743414020070417
(detailing that an estimated 34% of U.S. citizens own guns and over 200 million guns are in
private hands).
5 Richard Slotkin, Equalizers: The Cult of the Colt in American Culture, in GUNS, CRIME,
AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 54, 55 (Bernard E. Harcourt ed., 2003) (“The difference be-
tween the United States and Europe is that our culture grants a far broader license to private
individuals to use violence for private ends.”).
6 JAMES B. JACOBS, CAN GUN CONTROL WORK? 8, 10–11 (2002) (asserting that “[t]he
United States has much more violent crime, with and without firearms, than the other Western
democracies,” but also noting that much violent crime is “committed without any weapon[s]”);
Robert Weisberg, Values, Violence, and the Second Amendment: American Character, Con-
stitutionalism, and Crime, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2002) (“[A]mong ‘peer’ nations [the
United States] is exceptional for having the highest homicide rate . . . . [W]e are probably
exceptional in terms of the number of guns in private hands.”).
7 See, e.g., Richard Hofstadter, America as a Gun Culture, 21 AM. HERITAGE 4, 84 (Oct.
1970) (“Why is it that in all other modern democratic societies those endangered ask to have
such men disarmed, while in the United States alone they insist on arming themselves?”).
8 See LEE KENNETT & JAMES LAVERNE ANDERSON, THE GUN IN AMERICA 57 (1975).
9 Hofstadter, supra note 7, at 7, 10, 82.
10 KENNETT & ANDERSON, supra note 8, at 153–55.
11 Angela R. Riley, Indians and Guns, 100 GEO. L.J. 1675, 1685 (2012) (“Despite European
ambivalence about the exchange of firearms with the Native population, the gun trade grew
from embryonic to thriving in only a few decades.”).
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or limiting such trade.12 Guns that were sold to Indians were often inferior, ensuring
that whites would maintain an advantage over them.13 Similarly, possession by
slaves and free blacks was heavily regulated.14 According to federal law, the militia
of the several states was to be comprised only of white citizens, and some state con-
stitutions made clear that “negroes, mulattoes, and Indians” were excluded from
such participation.15 In the mid-nineteenth century, a majority of the Supreme Court
seemed bemused by the idea that a freed slave could be a citizen of the United
States.16 To consider him such, the Dred Scott majority opined, would mean not only
that blacks could travel and speak as they wished, but could also own guns.17 Surely,
the Court reasoned, the founding fathers would not have been so unmindful of the
safety of white citizens to have permitted such an absurd consequence.18
Even after the Civil War and the Reconstruction Amendments, Black Codes in
several states attempted to strip newly freed slaves from firearm possession, facili-
tating the ability of state and local militia forces and armed groups to terrorize the
12 THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 139–40 (J. Hammond Trumbull,
ed., 1850) (creating a restriction against selling ammunition to Indian tribe members); RECORDS
OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 392
(Nathaniel B. Shurtleff, ed., 1853) (banning the sale of ammunition or guns to Indian tribe
members); Riley, supra note 11, at 1686–87 (citing examples of colonial laws intended to
tamp down firearms trade with Indian tribes).
13 Riley, supra note 11, at 1691 (“Such fears [of violence against whites by Indians] were
commonly expressed by leaders who realized that guns had important utility in Indian-white
relations, but who were ever mindful of the potential tipping point whereby Indians could
become too powerful a military force. One ‘compromise’ was to engage in trade of guns with
Indians but ensure that the traded weapons were inferior to those owned by whites.”).
14 CLAYTON E. CRAMER, ARMED AMERICA 26 (2006); KENNETT & ANDERSON, supra
note 8, at 50 (describing early laws preventing blacks from gun ownership).
15  KY. CONST. of 1850, art. VII, § 1 (“The militia of this Commonwealth shall consist
of all free able-bodied male persons (negroes, mulattoes, and Indians excepted) . . . .”); Act
of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 271, 271 (1992) (“Be it enacted . . . [t]hat each and every
free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective states . . . who is or shall be of the age
of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years . . . shall severally and respectively
be enrolled in the militia . . . .”).
16 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 421 (1857), superseded by consti-
tutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
17 Id. at 417 (noting that if Scott were a “citizen” then courts would have to permit him
the rights of citizenship: “It would give to persons of the negro race . . . the right to . . . go
where they pleased at every hour of the day or night without molestation . . . the full liberty
of speech . . . to hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms
wherever they went” (emphasis added)).
18 Id. at 417 (“It is impossible, it would seem, to believe that the great men of the slave-
holding States, who took so large a share in framing the Constitution of the United States, and
exercised so much influence in procuring its adoption, could have been so forgetful or re-
gardless of their own safety and the safety of those who trusted and confided in them.”).
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newly freed population.19 And, coincident with large-scale immigration and the first
comprehensive federal immigration laws, several turn of the century gun statutes
excluded noncitizens from gun possession based on notions of foreigners’ proclivity
towards violence.20 Even in present day, over twenty states and the federal govern-
ment maintain alienage restrictions in their firearms statutes, differentiating between
citizens and noncitizens for certain aspects of firearm purchase and possession.21 And,
firearms offenses are among the crimes listed under the Immigration and Nationality
Act22 that place noncitizens in danger of deportation.23
Recent Supreme Court cases have exacerbated confusion over the inclusiveness
of the Second Amendment. District of Columbia v. Heller24 established that the right
to bear arms inured to individuals, based in part on the utility of handguns for self-
defense.25 Yet, in doing so, the case also potentially narrowed the constitutional mean-
ing of “the people,” interpreting the right to bear arms as one held by “Americans,”
“law-abiding citizens,” and “members of the political community.”26 McDonald v.
City of Chicago27 amplified the import of Heller’s curious description by ruling that
19 Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, “Never Intended to Be Applied to the White
Population”: Firearms Regulation and Racial Disparity—The Redeemed South’s Legacy to
a National Jurisprudence?, 70 CHI.–KENT L. REV. 1307, 1324–27 (1995).
20 See, e.g., Ex Parte Rameriz, 226 P. 914, 915, 921 (Cal. 1924) (upholding the consti-
tutionality of a statute that declared “no unnaturalized foreign-born person . . . shall own or
have in his possession . . . any . . . firearm capable of being concealed upon the person”),
abrogated by People v. Rappard, 104 Cal. Rptr. 535, 537 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (striking down
the same statute); KENNETT & ANDERSON, supra note 8, at 178 (discussing New York’s alien-
in-possession law); Concealed Pistols, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1905, at 6 (arguing for concealed
weapons laws in cities “filled with immigrants”).
21 See Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Aliens with Guns: Equal Protection, Federal Power, and
the Second Amendment, 92 IOWA L. REV. 891, 894–96 & nn.11–14 (detailing all state gun
statutes with some form of alienage distinction).
22 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006).
23 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C) (2006) (listing “firearms offenses” as deportable crimes); 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(C), (E) (2006) (defining “aggravated felonies” that subject immigrants
to removal).
24 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
25 Id. at 2818.
26 Id. at 2816–21. Although some might view Heller’s language in this regard as a col-
loquial usage intended to refer generally to the polity or a way of describing to whom civil
rights inure, I reject this view. Heller cites United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez for its refer-
ence to the “political community,” but in the Verdugo-Urquidez case, the Court instead used
the term “national community” to describe who may claim Fourth Amendment protections.
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990). The conscious use of “political
community” implies voting and participation rights—i.e., rights associated with citizenship—
in a way that “national community” does not. Further, citizenship is a statutorily defined term
with a specific meaning, and is used in the Constitution eleven times for specific purposes.
For further details, see Pratheepan Gulasekaram, “The People” of the Second Amendment:
Citizenship and the Right to Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521, 1534–37 (2010).
27 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
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the Second Amendment was incorporated against states and localities,28 but failing
to agree on an interpretative methodology. Justice Thomas’s critical fifth vote was
based on his belief that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities
Clause is the catalytic mechanism for incorporation.29 By its text, that clause only
applies to “citizens of the United States.”30 Taking Heller and McDonald at face
value, both holdings would seem to expand gun rights by limiting extreme state reg-
ulation, while simultaneously contracting the universe of those who may own guns
and claim the Second Amendment’s protections.
Post–Heller/McDonald cases continue and augment the tension inherent in gun
rights and citizenship posited by the Supreme Court. Recently, in United States v.
Portillo-Munoz,31 a case involving the conviction of an undocumented immigrant
under the federal alien-in-possession statute,32 the Fifth Circuit ruled, based on
Heller, that undocumented noncitizens were categorically barred from the Second
Amendment’s protection.33 It also surprisingly opined that “the people” of the
Second Amendment might be a narrower class of persons than “the people” of the
Fourth Amendment.34 The Fifth Circuit’s willingness to consider “the people” who
have the right to bear arms as a more select group than “the people” who are free
from unreasonable searches and seizures highlights the unique undercurrent of gun
rights as a symbol of belonging in America.35 The Supreme Court denied certiorari,
both allowing the Fifth Circuit’s strained reading to stand, and prolonging confusion
of the scope of those who may claim the right to bear arms.36
Not surprisingly then, a paradox of inclusion and exclusion lies at the heart of
firearms and claims to membership in the American polity. These historical develop-
ments, textual quandaries, and doctrinal quirks suggest that something deeper than
interpretative disagreement is bubbling beneath the surface in contests over who
should and should not have access to guns. Professor Mark Tushnet incisively iden-
tified this nascent force when he observed that “[t]he Second Amendment is one of
the arenas in which we as Americans try to figure out who we are,”37 and that gun
policy disputes have “become deeply enmeshed in the culture wars between liberals
and conservatives, between people who live in cities and people who live in the
28 Id. at 3046.
29 Id. at 3058–88 (Thomas, J., concurring).
30 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”).
31 643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1969 (2012).
32 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A) (2006).
33 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440.
34 Id. at 440–41 (opining that the Second and Fourth Amendments served different pur-
poses, and therefore “the people” need not be interpreted similarly in each).
35 Gulasekaram, supra note 26, at 1577–78.
36 Portillo-Munoz, 132 S. Ct. 1969 (2012) (denying writ of certiorari).
37 MARK V. TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE xiv (2007).
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country.”38 His intuition is echoed by Professors Dan Kahan and Donald Braman who
argue that attitudes and orientations towards gun policy are not about imperfect in-
formation or a dearth of accurate statistical work about the dangers or advantages of
firearm possession, but are “in truth, disputes among citizens who subscribe to com-
peting norms and to the conflicting cultural visions that those norms construct.”39
This Article uses these observations as a starting point to explore the relation-
ship between gun rights and notions of belonging in the American polity. Discussing
group-based gun prohibitions, Professor Tushnet correctly observed that under cur-
rent law, “it’s actually quite hard to come up with examples of selective prohibitions
that might be unconstitutional but that wouldn’t be caught by the Equal Protection
Clause.”40 Despite its non-obviousness, one such example is the area of alienage
and gun possession. Tushnet explained that people are motivated to donate to anti-
regulation legislative campaigns by the National Rifle Association (NRA) because
those people believe “a cultural struggle over national self-definition—is at stake.”41
Just as attitudes over gun rights characterize who we are philosophically and cul-
turally, so too, immigration and citizenship are the most basic and literal forms of
national composition and self-definition. Thus, while they seem to be disparate topics,
citizenship and gun control are culturally, politically, and legally linked.
At the legal intersection of guns and citizenship, current alien gun laws in both
federal and state statutory schemes have survived the twentieth century’s expanded
constitutional protections for noncitizens. I provided a survey of the various federal
and state laws on the issue and an analysis of judicial evaluation of the same in my
first paper in the series, Aliens with Guns: Equal Protection, Federal Power, and the
Second Amendment.42 Following that, I provided a closer look at the constitutional
interpretation problems posed by Heller’s citizenship language in my second paper
in the series, “The People” of the Second Amendment: Citizenship and the Right to
Bear Arms.43
Here, in my third exploration at the nexus of guns and citizenship, I reflect on the
paradoxical nature of gun rights and membership, focusing on the exclusionary and in-
clusionary nature of firearms in the American historical, cultural, and legal narrative.
First, this Article will briefly elucidate the nature of the constitutional conflict
with regards to citizenship and the right to bear arms. In Part II, it elaborates on the
dual nature of firearms vis-à-vis membership, highlighting how guns have helped
define who is, and who is not, a member of the American polity.
38 Id.
39 Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: Cultural Theory
of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1297 (2003).
40 TUSHNET, supra note 37, at 120.
41 Id. at 77.
42 Gulasekaram, supra note 21.
43 Gulasekaram, supra note 26.
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Next, Part III attempts to map group-based exclusions in gun rights onto broader
theories explaining Americans’ attitudes towards gun control. Specifically, this
Article will use Professors Kahan and Braman’s “cultural theory of risk” explanation
of firearm policy preferences44 to show how and where citizenship distinctions in
gun rights fit into cultural orientations on gun control.
In Part IV, this Article will show how competing perspectives on the inclusive-
ness of the Second Amendment lead to the current variation in policies affecting
noncitizens and gun rights, arguing that alien gun laws offer uneasy but acceptable
compromises for both conservative gun control opponents and liberal gun control
proponents. Finally, Part V concludes by considering some broader implications of
the idea of guns as a unique marker of American identity.
Fundamentally, the competing constitutional and policy perspectives on gun
control generally, and noncitizen possession specifically, draw on deeply held beliefs
about constitutional values and historical traditions to stake their claim about the
centrality of guns to American identity.45 Accordingly, citizenship restrictions in gun
laws and the limited reach of “the people” in the Second Amendment are not im-
portant because the restrictions are especially weighty or because millions of im-
migrants are clamoring for equal firearms rights;46 indeed, given the ethos of private
arms ownership in many immigrant-sending countries,47 the issue likely does not
have immediate practical salience.48 Even now, with greater availability, gun owners
are still likely to be white, male, from rural areas, and protestant.49
Rather, as with most controversies in the great American gun debate, the restric-
tion and interpretation are important because of the symbolic and legal values they
vindicate.50 Such emblematic and philosophical debates are an inherent part of Second
Amendment controversies; even the gun enthusiasts’ major victory in Heller appears
to have little practical effect on gun laws, with most restrictions upheld despite the
case’s grand pronouncements.51 Thus, this Article’s inquiry follows in this tradition,
44 Kahan & Braman, supra note 39, at 1323 (arguing that cultural orientations predict gun
views, not facts).
45 See Hofstadter, supra note 7, at 82–83.
46 Gulasekaram, supra note 21, at 1578–79.
47 See generally Arie Bauer et al., A Comparison of Firearms—Related Legislation on
Four Continents, 22 MED. & LAW 105 (2003).
48 And, although Heller and McDonald appear to allow regulation of all noncitizens, see
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3040, 3047 (2010); District of Columbia v. Heller,
128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008), most current alienage restrictions in state and federal law are nuanced:
while some restrict all noncitizen possession, some only restrict noncitizen concealed carry.
See also Gulasekaram, supra note 21, at 895 nn.11–12. Some restrict only particular noncit-
izens (e.g., temporary or undocumented noncitizens). Id. at 895–96.
49 See Hofstadter, supra note 7, at 7.
50 Franklin E. Zimring, Continuity and Change in the American Gun Debate, in GUNS,
PUNISHMENT, AND CRIME 29, 32 (Bernard Harcourt, ed., 2003).
51 Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1553 (2009) (“[B]ased on
a census of all the post-Heller Second Amendment cases to date, it appears that the newfound
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elucidating the symbolic importance of citizenship distinctions in gun rights, contem-
plating how the American polity views itself and outsiders, and discussing the dynam-
ics of intergroup and interpersonal interactions in the American Republican tradition.
I. THE PEOPLE AND SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Noncitizens are uniquely situated with regards to rights and benefits, including
gun rights. Unlike racial groups, constitutional and statutory expansions do not nec-
essarily have to include noncitizens.52 The Constitution itself makes citizenship a
qualification for elected office and voting in federal elections.53 The federal govern-
ment can—and routinely does—make distinctions based on citizenship.54 In addition
to the obvious case of federal immigration law determining admissibility and re-
movability,55 federal welfare law distinguishes on the basis of alienage.56 Regarding
the Bill of Rights, noncitizens suffer consequences for expressive activity that citizens
are free to engage in,57 and not all noncitizens can invoke the Fourth Amendment’s
protection against unreasonable search and seizure.58 Further, although sub-federal
governments are sometimes limited in their capacity to discriminate on the basis of
alienage,59 states and localities are permitted to also employ alienage distinctions
when it comes to aspects of self-definition, self-government, and political participa-
tion like voting, jury service, and state employment that has discretionary authority
over citizens.60
Put simply, courts have ruled that in many situations, our national, state, and
local governments may rationally exclude noncitizens from certain rights, benefits,
individual right has almost no significant effect on gun control; Heller’s bark is much worse
than its right.”).
52 Gulasekaram, supra note 21, at 896–97.
53 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. II. § 1, cl. 5; U.S. CONST. amend. XV;
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV; 18 U.S.C. § 611 (2006).
54 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377–78 (1971) (holding that certain state
statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause and encroached on federal power to regulate
entrance and residence).
55 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1227 (2006).
56 8 U.S.C. § 1624 (2006) (devolving power to the states to make alienage distinctions
in welfare provision); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (upholding federal alienage
distinctions in public benefits).
57 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(D) (2006) (stating members of a totalitarian party are inadmis-
sible); 8 U.S.C. § 1424 (2006) (barring naturalization for applicants who have engaged in
certain advocacy); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (upholding the inadmissi-
bility determination of an applicant with communist associations).
58 See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
59 See, e.g., Richardson, 403 U.S. 365.
60 See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (upholding state alienage distinctions for
hiring public school teachers); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (upholding state alienage
distinctions for hiring state troopers).
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jobs, and programs.61 Generally the types of exclusions that have passed constitu-
tional muster could be defended on a theory of participation in self-government,62
with discrimination condoned when noncitizens present some plausible threat to the
well-being of republican political institutions. As I have argued elsewhere,63 citizen-
ship distinctions in gun laws could fit this framework—and therefore be understood
like prohibitions in holding elected office, serving on juries, and certain types of
political associations—when the Second Amendment is understood as a right re-
lated to protection of or from the sovereign. They make less sense when the Second
Amendment is interpreted, as it was in Heller, as a right of personal self-defense.64
Heller, however, does not entirely disregard the romantic mythology of armed
citizen vigilance when tyranny is nigh (indeed, it celebrates it).65 As such, a citizen-
only reading of the Second Amendment maintains a small, but theoretically plau-
sible constitutional basis—at least during times of existential threat to the Republic.
The most obvious existential threats to the Nation have come during times of war,
terrorism, and conflict, when foreign governments and foreigners endanger American
lives, institutions, and social well-being.
This equivocation over potential uses for firearms and the rationale behind the
Second Amendment is apparent in a case like United States v. Portillo-Munoz, where
the Fifth Circuit upheld a conviction against an undocumented immigrant under fed-
eral firearms law.66 In doing so, that court rejected the defendant-immigrant’s con-
tention that Heller’s vision of the right to bear arms undermined the constitutionality
of the federal alien-in-possession law.67 The Fifth Circuit’s opinion, which the Supreme
Court declined to review,68 opined that noncitizens were excluded from “the people”
protected by the Second Amendment.69 Curiously, the court seemed to indicate that
the right to bear arms was different from other Bill of Rights guarantees, suggesting
that whatever “the people” meant in the Fourth Amendment, such an interpretation
need not apply to the Second Amendment.70 The ruling is an example of how the
complicated relationship between gun rights and citizenship rights, and concomitant
definitions of “the people” in the Constitution, resists simple explanation.
61 See, e.g., id.
62 See Gulasekaram, supra note 26, at 1570–77.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 1575.
65 Darrell A.H. Miller, Retail Rebellion and the Second Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 939, 940
(2011) (“Portions of Heller seem giddy with revolutionary fervor: ‘[W]hen the able-bodied
men of a nation are trained in arms and organized, they are better able to resist tyranny. . . .’”
(quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008))).
66 United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 442 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132
S. Ct. 1969 (2012).
67 Id. at 439–40.
68 Portillo-Munoz v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1969 (2012) (denying certiorari to petitioner).
69 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440.
70 Id. at 440–41.
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Portillo-Munoz makes explicit what many may find implicitly or silently dis-
quieting about guns and noncitizens in our constitutional order—that there is just
something unsettling about extending gun rights to those who are not full members
of the American polity. The Bill of Rights and the personal liberties enshrined by the
Constitution are hallowed protections that citizens rightfully may lay claim to.71 Even
in its most restrictive reading, “the people” of the Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth
Amendments, the “persons” of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal
Protection provisions, and the “citizens” of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges
or Immunities Clause, include at least those who are, by constitutional or statutory
mandate, citizens of the United States.72
For noncitizens, however, the extent of constitutional protections is unsettled
and much-debated territory,73 especially when those noncitizens are temporary vis-
itors or unlawfully present persons.74 Protecting all persons, regardless of citizenship
status, clearly increases the cost of governmental action (e.g., by requiring greater
process in removal hearings or applying the exclusionary rule for evidence obtained
for prosecutions)75 or prohibits the government from treating noncitizens in a par-
ticular way (e.g., by disallowing the government from forcing hard labor as punish-
ment on those whom it has decided to deport).76
But increasing the time, expense, and hassle of government action is different,
both in kind and gravity than prohibiting noncitizens from possessing a particular
instrument—guns. Guns are a unique tool of both defense and offense, with a singu-
lar ability to allow an individual to coerce another.77 Perhaps more importantly, they
facilitate the ability of an organized few to impose their will on a larger populace.78
While any person may want and require a powerful tool of self-defense, perhaps
only those we consider true members of the polity—Americans—should be able to
possess firearms because of the potential to use them to protect against foreign in-
vasions and tyrannical uses of government. Portillo-Munoz, and a line of prior cases,
raises the concerns implicit in reading “the people” broader than “citizens” at least
71 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2790–91 (2008).
72 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,
265, 269 (1990).
73 Gulasekaram, supra note 21, at 896.
74 See, e.g., Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440–41.
75 Cf. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (rejecting a noncitizen’s claim that a search of his
property located in a foreign country was unconstitutional); Mezei v. Shaughnessy, 345 U.S.
206, 212 (1953) (declining to apply constitutional due process in an inadmissibility decision,
stating that “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an
alien denied entry is concerned” (quoting Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950))).
76 Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (holding that forcing deportable
noncitizens into hard labor prior to deportation violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments).
77 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3108 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78 See id. at 3039 (majority opinion).
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with regards to this singular, exceptional feature of American society—private
gun possession.79
Heller, McDonald, and Portillo-Munoz explicitly tie gun rights to citizenship
through their interpretation of “the people,” thus potentially excluding noncitizens
from at least one part of the Constitution’s largesse. The idea that the Constitution only
protects citizens’ gun rights speaks to the uniqueness of firearms in the American
historical and cultural narrative. All Americans and immigrants within America,
whether they own a gun or do not (or want to or do not want to), likely view the gun
as a symbol of American identity. Whether it should be, however, is a matter of
entrenched and divisive debate.80
II. A PARADOX OF INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION
The relationship between firearms and American identity is complex because
access to, and use of, guns has functioned as both a liberating and democratizing
force, on the one hand, and as a tool of coercion and oppression, on the other. Even
though other nations boast private ownership percentages higher than the United
States,81 there is still something distinct about the ethic and uses of private gun own-
ership here.82 First, our Constitution expressly addresses arms-bearing, and protects
some form of it alongside our other Bill of Rights freedoms.83 Second, the amount of
privately held guns in America dwarfs other countries.84 Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the gun has become a part of our national mythology, weaving its way
into creation stories and the conquests that defined and continue to define America.85
The inclusionary story starts with Madison’s assertion that guns were the
“advantage” that distinguished Americans.86 And, as Professor Angela Riley in-
sightfully suggests, one conception of the relationship between Indians and guns is
progressive integration into the American polity, with Indians strengthening their
claims to gun rights concomitantly with their claims of citizenship.87 During the
Reconstruction period, it was the freedmen’s claim to equal recognition that laid the
foundation for an individualized, self-defense reading of the Second Amendment.88
79 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440–41.
80 See, e.g., Hofstadter, supra note 7, at 4.
81 See Small Arms Survey 2007: Guns and the City, SMALL ARMS SURVEY (2007), avail-
able at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/by-type/yearbook.html.
82 Slotkin, supra note 5, at 55–56.
83 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
84 See Bauer et al., supra note 47.
85 David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and Second Amendment Revolution: Con-
juring with the People, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 879, 886–90 (1996).
86 Gulasekaram, supra note 26, at 1547–48 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 238 (James
Madison) (Lawrence Goldman ed., 2008)).
87 Riley, supra note 11, at 1682.
88 Miller, supra note 65, at 965.
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During the civil rights movement of the 1960s, the Black Panther Party used osten-
tatious displays of their firepower to demand inclusion and equality.89
But this same instrument that signified inclusion, also operated as a dividing
line, excluding other groups who were not considered full members of the American
polity. During the revolutionary and founding period, in some states, those who
would not swear loyalty oaths to the newly emerging nation were not permitted to
possess guns.90 In addition, gun laws were used to help maintain the political and
social hierarchy that kept outgroups from accessing the rights and processes af-
forded to white male citizens. The coercive power of the gun and its ability to fa-
cilitate rule over many by a few, allowed slave-owners to maintain control over
slave populations.91 During the Reconstruction, organized groups of former confed-
erates, pro-slavery advocates, and racists used firearms to enforce Black Codes and
reinstate the antebellum racial hierarchy.92 As immigrants began entering the United
States in large waves, states enacted explicit and implicit regulations on alien posses-
sion and the types of arms that were easily found in immigrant-heavy urban centers.93
And, some critics have complained that federal gun control laws are disproportion-
ately aimed at minority populations.94
These themes of inclusion and exclusion are poignantly manifest in Malcolm X’s
famous “The Ballot or the Bullet” speech in 1964 at a gathering of mostly African
Americans in Cleveland, Ohio.95 In his remarks he first identified himself as an
outsider to the American polity, proffering that, despite being a citizen, he did not
89 Adam Winkler, The Secret History of Guns, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 2011, http://www
.theatlantic.com/magazine/print/2011/09/the-secret-history-of-guns/308608/ (“Guns became
central to the Panthers’ identity, as they taught their early recruits that ‘the gun is the only
thing that will free us—gain us our liberation.’”).
90 Cornell & DeDino, supra note 2, at 506–07; Saul Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism:
The Standard Model, the Second Amendment, and the Problem of History in Contemporary
Constitutional Theory, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 221, 228–29 (1999).
91 Carl T. Bogus, Race, Riots, and Guns, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1365, 1374 (1993); Robert H.
Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the Right to Keep Arms in Early America:
The Legal Context of the Second Amendment, 25 L. & HIST. REV. 139, 148 (2007).
92 Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 19, at 1324–27; Winkler, supra note 89 (“After losing
the Civil War, Southern states quickly adopted the Black Codes . . . . One common provision
barred blacks from possessing firearms. To enforce the gun ban, white men riding in posses
began terrorizing black communities.”).
93 KENNETT & ANDERSON, supra note 8, at 167 (“Added to this rising concern was a dis-
turbing and alien element. The public had always been sensitive to the dangers of armed mi-
norities such as blacks and Indians, but this concern took on new dimensions as cities filled
with unassimilated masses of immigrants . . . .”); Gulasekaram, supra note 26, at 1547–48;
Concealed Pistols, supra note 20, at 6.
94 Winkler, supra note 89 (“Because these inexpensive pistols were popular in minority
communities, one critic said the new federal gun legislation ‘was passed not to control guns
but to control blacks.’”); see also Bogus, supra note 91, at 1366.
95 MALCOLM X SPEAKS 23 (George Breitman ed., 1965).
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consider himself an American.96 Purportedly speaking as an outsider, his speech
urged his listeners to force political elites and government authorities to recognize
their rights by either voting en masse as a block or taking up arms—in his words,
Blacks would either have to cast “a ballot or a bullet.”97 And, if governmental au-
thorities did not protect their lives and property, Malcolm X exhorted his listeners
to use their Second Amendment rights to secure those protections for themselves.98
If the government wants to avoid twenty-two million black people with guns, it
should “do its job,” he warned.99
His speech exemplifies the paradoxes and aspirations represented by the gun in
America through present day. Without a real voice in the political process, those
who are traditionally excluded from power structures and wealth distributions are
not truly American, sometimes even when they are citizens. Governmental and pri-
vate forces have at times used force to intimidate outgroups and maintain their
exclusion from the political process. But, arms-bearing—a right preserved in the
Constitution and arguably only available to those included in “the people”—can also
be used by outsiders to seek recognition of civil and political rights. The equating
of voting with gun rights highlights the democratizing potential of both, and the
ability of either to force inclusion and recognition in the American political and
cultural consciousness.100
Malcolm X’s resort, despite his claim to not feel American, to a distinctly Amer-
ican right, as a method of forcing recognition and inclusion comports with the
mythical uses of the gun in American history. But, his outsiders’ invocation of this
well-worn trope features a twist on the classic American tale: generally those who
are presumed to possess the right to check tyrannous governmental authority are
limited to the true heirs of the founding generation, inheriting their mantle as the
collective “the people” authorized to maintain sovereignty in the polity;101 Malcolm
X’s speech, however, calls upon those originally excluded from the Constitution to
use firearms to vindicate their membership status against majoritarian preferences.
96 Id. at 25.
97 Id. at 30.
98 See id. (although not explicitly referencing the Second Amendment).
99 Id. at 36, 43.
100 Notably, even voting—perhaps the right most tightly associated with citizenship—was
not limited to citizens in several states until the early to mid-twentieth century (with the caveat
that noncitizens who were allowed to vote were typically white/European noncitizens). See
Leon E. Aylsworth, The Passing of Alien Suffrage, 25 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 114, 114 (1931);
Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional, and Theoretical
Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1416–17 (1993).
101 See Williams, supra note 85, at 908 (“Thus, when the Framers discussed revolution,
they imagined the People acting as a body, an organic entity with a single will.”). Williams
argues “it is time to accept [that armed resistance in present-day America would be a civil
war]; it is time to stop conjuring with the idea of an organic American people, because that
idea leads us in the direction of the militia’s thinking—to the creation of an alien Other
against whom we could all be united.” Id. at 885.
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Finally, the speech suggests the possibility that participation in deliberative
self-government may obviate the need for private firearm possession. The condi-
tion he imposes on his call to armament—the government’s failure to do its job102—
highlights a fundamental divide in attitudes towards gun control. While some believe
that the existence of governmental authority, like police forces, the National Guard,
the U.S. Military, and an independent judiciary obviate the need for personal arma-
ment,103 others are both fearful of the governmental monopoly on deadly force and the
inability of those armed authorities to eliminate the need for all personal defense.104
Ultimately, his thoughts represent the difficulties inherent at the nexus of guns
and membership in the national community. Malcolm X positions himself as an
outsider to the polity (i.e., not one of “the people”), but an outsider whose call to
armed resistance is, at its core, a product of the Constitution and our national ethos.
He never resolves this apparent contradiction, but perhaps that is not surprising.
Fifty years later, firearms remain at the center of American mythology and consti-
tutional contestation, helping to keep noncitizens at the literal and metaphorical
borders of membership and participation in the American polity.
III. CITIZENSHIP AND THE GUN CONTROL DEBATE
In addition to constitutional conflicts highlighted in Part I and the paradox of
inclusion and exclusion discussed in Part II, questions of membership and identity
tie into the broader public debates over gun control as well. Part III will connect
concerns over noncitizen possession to the larger firearms debate over regulation
versus deregulation.105 This section proffers that the central debate over gun control,
grounded in crime data, forensic evidence, and policy prescriptions, is intimately
connected to a more cosmic one about the essential aspects of American identity,
and worldviews regarding coexistence in our pluralistic republican society.
A. Cultural Theory of Risk & Alien Gun Laws
The two polestars of general gun debate are, crudely labeled, a gun advocates
view and a gun control view. Each perspective lays claim to the rich mixture of folk-
lore and fact that undergird the constitutional right to bear arms. These perspectives
roughly correspond to political party affiliation, with conservatives and libertar-
ians (and hence, Republicans) generally favoring deregulation, and liberals and
102 MALCOLM X SPEAKS, supra note 95, at 43.
103 See Miller, supra note 65, at 941–42 (discussing when the need for personal armament
arises as it pertains to governmental authority).
104 Id. at 942.
105 See, e.g., JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME 24 (2000); Mark Duggan, More
Guns, More Crime, 109 J. POL. ECON. 1086 (2001). With regards to Lott’s study, see also Ian
Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns Less Crime” Hypothesis, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1193 (2003).
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progressives (and hence, Democrats) generally favoring regulation.106 Both sides of
the debate have attempted to win the policy battle by offering mountains of data on
either the evils or the benefits of gun ownership.107 But, as Professors Kahan and
Braman prove, views on gun regulation are rarely changed by econometric data.108
Instead, they show that attitudes towards gun possession and regulation are not
about imperfect information, or even merely based on party affiliation,109 but rather
a disagreement over the social meaning of firearms.110 Those social meanings, in
turn, are influenced by individuals’ default cultural perspective on what constitutes
a good society; differently oriented individuals have differing assessments of what
risks are morally and socially acceptable. The intractability of these positions is why,
after several decades, the polity has not achieved, and likely may never achieve,
agreement on gun control.111
In their taxonomy towards a theory of cultural attitudes towards firearms, Kahan
and Braman posit that individuals’ attitudes towards guns are most heavily influenced
by whether their ingrained cultural orientations are (a) hierarchical, (b) egalitarian,
or (c) individualistic.112 Those who hold hierarchical views (and privilege traditional
forms of social and political authority) are significantly more likely to oppose gun
control than those who hold egalitarian views (and abhor stratification and prefer
collective action).113 Similarly, those who hold individualistic views (and favor au-
tonomy and private ordering) are significantly more likely to oppose gun control
than those who believe in solving societal problems as a collective whole.114
Kahan and Braman argue that attitudes towards gun regulation solidify and be-
come deeply held because policy preferences are tied to these cultural orientations,
each of which is attuned to value risks in different ways. To accept the other’s posi-
tion on gun regulation would be to accept a morally and socially inferior worldview.
Whereas an individualistic person might believe it a cowardly concession to disarm
in the face of a violent society, those who hold a more egalitarian view might
believe that private armament sends unacceptable messages about our “collective
indifference” to each other and the mistrust we have of our compatriots.115
106 See Zimring, supra note 50, at 31.
107 Kahan & Braman, supra note 39, at 1292.
108 Id. at 1324.
109 Id. at 1307 (arguing that cultural orientation matters have more explanatory weight
than partisan affiliation with respect to gun control preferences).
110 Id. at 1297 (“Thus, even when framed in narrowly factual terms, public disagreements
over risks are, in truth, disputes among citizens who subscribe to competing norms and to
the conflicting cultural visions that those norms construct.”).
111 Id. at 1292 (“Yet we are no closer to achieving consensus on the major issues today
than we were ten, thirty, or even eighty years ago.”).
112 Id. at 1297.
113 Id. at 1297–98, 1306–07.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 1317–18.
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Parts III.B and C that follow attempt to map some of these empirical observations
onto the terrain of immigrants and gun rights. On the specific question of alienage
restrictions, those with hierarchical and individualistic cultural perspectives likely
base their desire for personal armament on the belief that American society is con-
stantly under threat of conflict.116 One of the specific manifestations of that conflict
is persistent antagonism between races and between current members of the political
community and foreigners.117 In addition, the individualistic gun control opponent
might also believe in the perpetual danger of government tyranny against the sov-
ereign peoples. As Kahan and Braman note, those who hold hierarchical and indi-
vidualist cultural orientations—i.e., those most highly associated with opposing gun
control—fear social deviance and the risk of foreign invasion.118 On this view, mem-
bers of the polity should recognize that the threat of violent struggle is inherent in
the American Republic. Therefore, everyone should remain armed to ensure the sur-
vival of both themselves and the Republic.
In contrast, the egalitarian-solidaristic gun control proponent might see the pro-
liferation of governmental institutions and the gradual inclusion of outgroups as evi-
dence of an evolving society that need not fear tyranny or uncontrolled interpersonal
violence. For these individuals, the real or theoretical costs associated with deregula-
tion are either trivial or acceptable in relation to the value of putative benefits. Even
assuming, for argument’s sake, that certain crime might persist or rise without pri-
vate gun ownership, it would be an acceptable cost for a gun-free society.119
B. Gun Deregulation and Noncitizens in the American Polity
Based on the research that hierarchically and individualistically oriented indivi-
duals favor deregulation of firearms, this section offers some potential links between
these groups’ views towards gun regulation and citizenship prohibitions. Fundamen-
tally, what might motivate those who believe in general deregulation is a nascent
concern for the intractability of intergroup and interpersonal violent conflict, and the
necessity of private armament to guard against those risks. This concern inherently
implicates citizenship and ideas of membership because violence and threat of vio-
lence in America have often been influenced and galvanized by racial tension and
fear of foreign elements.
116 Id. at 1298 (“Hierarchists and individualists have their own distinctive anxieties—of
the dangers of social deviance, the risks of foreign invasion, or the fragility of economic
institutions—which egalitarians predictably dismiss.”).
117 Id. at 1292.
118 Id. at 1298.
119 Id. at 1315–16 (“Control supporters, for example, argue that arming private citizens to
deter crime would endorse a vision of ‘society based on an internal . . . balance of terror’—‘a
jungle where each relies on himself for survival.’ ‘[A] world with slightly higher crime
levels,’ they assert, is a price worth paying to avoid a world ‘in which we routinely wave
guns at each other.’” (footnotes omitted)).
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The anti-control view—pithily captured in the NRA bumper sticker slogans
“Guns don’t kill people, people kill people” and “If you outlaw guns, only outlaws
will have them”120—focuses on the nature of people, not the instrumentality. On this
view, no one should be disarmed because violent tendencies and entropy towards
societal breakdown are inherent in people, not in the tools they might use. If anyone at
all is to be disarmed, however, it would be identifiable groups and persons more prone
to pose a danger and threat to the greater majority of persons and who can be reason-
ably excluded from “the people” protected by the Constitution. Indeed, Heller, while
recognizing an individual’s right to bear arms as a mode of self-defense, does exactly
that, excluding felons, the mentally ill, and noncitizens from the Second Amendment.121
More importantly, in this view, disarmament is a moral problem: it is cowardly
to disarm private citizens and rely on public authority to maintain public safety.122
People with violent and dangerous proclivities—either towards good order or towards
fellow people—are a fixed part of a pluralist society, and private individuals are ap-
propriately armed to provide self-help to counter those threats when needed. This
trope of mistrust underlying the anti-control perspective—mistrust of authority, mis-
trust of certain individuals—connects with the proclivities of both hierarchists and
individualists.123 Those with hierarchical views may worry about threats to tradi-
tional power structures and instability in political and cultural institutions created
by emerging or nontraditionally powerful groups. Individualists may worry about
the threats to personal well-being that cannot be addressed by public ordering alone.
Those threats would presumably increase as immigrants—people with whom the
citizens have not had a long history of contact and trust—enter the polity.
The beauty of the American Republican scheme, from the hierarchical and indi-
vidualist deregulation perspective, is that it allows rivalrous groups and persons to
coexist, albeit uneasily, as everyone stands on armed guard against potential threats
from without as well as from within. This view also allows for, although does not
require, defining “the people” of the Second Amendment so as to identity true
Americans, i.e., those eligible to engage in the potential right of rebellion against
tyranny or existential threat,124 and armed self-defense.125 The doomsday scenarios
justifying widespread personal armament would seem to stem from a belief that hu-
man frailty—and not the instrumentalities of violence—are the cause of tragedy.
The vicious cycle inherent in this outlook, however, is that the frailty of some per-
sons requires others to remain on constant armed vigil.
Perhaps, part of the fear motivating the gun control opponents is the idea that in-
terpersonal crime and intergroup hostility are stepping stones towards the Hobbesian
120 See DENNIS A. HENIGAN, LETHAL LOGIC 13, 37 (2009).
121 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816–17 (2008).
122 Kahan & Braman, supra note 39, at 1318.
123 Id. at 1297–98.
124 See generally Williams, supra note 85.
125 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2783, 2822.
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nightmare of an anarchical or disordered society.126 In his defining work, Leviathan,
Thomas Hobbes argued that in the absence of a strong central government mankind
was destined for bellum omnium contra omnes—the “war of all against all.”127
Further, he described man in his state of nature as brutish, willing to kill for material
and reputational gain.128 Hobbes’s solution to these shortcomings was a public au-
thority that would control for human deficiencies.129
The U. S. Constitution creates a central authority, but one whose strength and
capabilities are even now the subject of normative and legal contestation.130 The in-
clusion of the Second Amendment, at the time of ratification, reflects unease with
this centralized structure.131 The Second Amendment allows gun owners to concep-
tualize themselves as meta-enforcers of constitutional norms, by disciplining those
who discipline the polity;132 meanwhile it provides a mode of self-defense and self-
help should the governmental structure collapse and Americans return to a state of
nature. Thus, an underlying strand of republican society, in this view, has always been
a readiness to confront a Hobbesian armed free-for-all.133
The possibility of mutual distrust and violence predicted by Hobbes, finds a
doppelganger in Madison’s theories of the republican political process itself. In his
oft-quoted Federalist No. 10, Madison posits that factions—groups with allied
interests against other groups—will emerge with potentially violent disagreements
between each other.134 Their existence is an unalterable truth underlying his theory
of the American constitutional order:
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man . . . .
A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning Gov-
ernment and many other points . . . have in turn divided mankind
into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered
them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other, than to
126 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 103 (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1950) (1651).
127 Id. at 103; THOMAS HOBBES, DE CIVE 13 (Sterling P. Lamprecht ed., Apple-Century-
Crofts, Inc. 1949) (1642).
128 HOBBES, supra note 126, at 104.
129 Id. at 3.
130 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (where the
Court’s majority and dissents disputed the recent Health Care Act regarding the extent of
federal power and its proper scope).
131 Williams, supra note 85, at 888 (“Indeed, modern theorists of the Second Amendment
would probably agree on only one point: fear of the central government largely inspired
the Amendment.”).
132 See Williams, supra note 85, at 892; Bob Herbert, A Threat We Can’t Ignore, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 2009, at A19 (quoting Wayne LaPierre, Executive Vice President of the NRA,
as stating “Our founding fathers understood that the guys with the guns make the rules”).
133 Weisberg, supra note 6, at 15.
134 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 40 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
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cooperate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of
mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial
occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinc-
tions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions, and
excite their most violent conflicts.135
Madison’s description correlates perfectly with the persistence of actual or imagined
intergroup hostility that has fueled firearms regulation from the founding through
the present. As Kahan and Braman note, “Pitting women against men, blacks against
whites, suburban against rural, Northeast against South and West, Protestants against
Catholics and Jews, the gun question reinforces the most volatile sources of faction-
alization in our political life.”136
Implicitly, this stance belies a particular view of violence in the American state—
a violence that is interwoven into the fabric of the nation.137 American violence has
many causes, but possibly stems in part from the violent birth of the nation in war,
and its violent rebirth in the Civil War and its aftermath.138 In these instances, the
groups of greatest concern to political majorities have been racial minorities and
noncitizen foreigners (who, in many instances, are racially distinct from the majority
of the American polity).139
Indeed, the creation mythology of the republic centers around the image of a gun-
toting militia man, fulfilling his civic obligation to his nation by bearing arms against
English loyalists and the English army.140
The British, however, were amongst the first group of noncitizens against whom
the firearm was used or necessary. Since that time, American history is replete with
examples of intergroup hostility as the basis for arms-bearing.141 In between and after
those examples of nation-birthing conflict, guns were used to help expand and win the
135 Id. at 41–42 (emphasis added).
136 Kahan & Braman, supra note 39, at 1292.
137 Cf. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 214 (“Violence is a multifaceted and deeply entrenched
phenomenon in American society. Violence implicates our history, including slavery and the
near genocide of Native Americans, our economic system, including the widening gap be-
tween the wealthy and the poor; our social organization, including a multiplicity of ethnic,
racial, and religious groups; our culture, including extreme emphasis on individual achieve-
ment and material success; our family values, including extremely high rates of teenage preg-
nancy and families without fathers; our patterns of drug use, including a tremendous amount
of alcohol and drug abuse and a close relationship between alcohol, drugs, and violence; our
mental health, including high levels of anxiety, stress, depression, and serious pathology; and
our criminal justice system, especially penal institutions that breed and amplify violence.”)
138 Miller, supra note 65, at 968.
139 Gulasekaram, supra note 26, at 1543; Riley, supra note 11, at 1650.
140 Williams, supra note 85, at 886–89.
141 Gulasekaram, supra note 26, at 1543.
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frontier from Indians,142 maintain a strict racial hierarchy despite the end of slavery,143
promote and stabilize a rapidly industrializing nation with changing urban demo-
graphics,144 and, in present day, guard the border of the country.145 Indeed, the first
mass-produced and widely popular handgun, the Samuel Colt pistol, was advertised
by playing upon themes of interethnic aggression.146 Although strong evidence indi-
cates that Colt invented his pistol on a merchant ship on a voyage to Asia,147 his ad-
vertising gambit stated that the idea was born of a slave insurrection, and the white
planters’ need to be armed with multiple shots against non-white rebels.148 And, as
Adam Winkler recently elaborated, the Black Panthers’ ostentatious display of fire-
arms at the California state capital prompted significant regulatory backlash.149
So too, fears of immigrant violence are not surprising either.150 Several state
alien gun laws at the turn of the twentieth century were directed specifically at the
danger of violence to persons and the sovereign created by the increased numbers
of immigrants in urban centers.151 The mid-twentieth century disputes over the con-
tents of the Hawaii Constitution specifically concerned fears of intergroup violence,
as delegates argued over the danger to the citizen population created by allowing
noncitizens to possess firearms.152 Even in our current era, many states and localities
142 Riley, supra note 11, at 1681–82.
143 Gulasekaram, supra note 26, at 1548.
144 Id. at 1557–60.
145 Id. at 1525 & n.24.
146 Slotkin, supra note 5, at 59–60.
147 Id. at 59.
148 See id. at 59–60.
149 Winkler, supra note 89.
150 Weisberg, supra note 6, at 18; see also Rubén G. Rumbaut & Walter A. Ewing, The
Myth of Immigrant Criminality, Immigration Policy Center, AM. IMMIGR. L. FOUND., May 23,
2007, available at http://borderbattles.ssrc.org/Rumbault_Ewing.
151 KENNETT & ANDERSON, supra note 8, at 167–78; Gulasekaram, supra note 26, at
1557–60; Leti Volpp, Obnoxious to Their Very Nature: Asian Americans and Constitutional
Citizenship, in 5 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 57, 63–66 (2001) (discussing the political effects of in-
creased immigration).
152 See State v. Mendoza, 920 P.2d 357, 366–67 (Haw. 1996) (quoting Committee of the
Whole Rep. No. 5, in II PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII OF
1950, at 10–15 (1961)). The Convention produced the following colloquy:
BRYAN: . . . . I think the reason that this [protection of citizen gun
possession] is in here is because we don’t want to see the legislature
pass a law absolutely prohibiting the use or the ownership of firearms
by the citizens. You’ll find in history that it is the illegally armed mi-
nority that actually we’re faced with as far as the trouble is concerned.
The legally armed majority are the ones that should have the right to
protect themselves and I believe that this provision gives it to them.
. . . .
FUKUSHIMA: If we did not have such a section in, the legislature
can very well go ahead and discriminate non-citizens from citizens. This
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have reacted with legislation intended to preserve the culture of their current demo-
graphic majorities against perceived threats by the newcomers.153 Since 2001, vio-
lent hate crimes against immigrants of South Asian and Middle Eastern descent have
steadily increased.154 As Professor Muneer Ahmad notes, courts have at times treated
such crimes committed by white American citizens as “crime[s] of passion,” excus-
ing the conduct of those citizens.155 A spike in gun sales followed both 9/11156 and
President Obama’s assumption of front-runner status in the 2008 election;157 and, in
both instances, coincided with the rise in hate groups and crimes.158 Since it was un-
likely that those firearms would be used in a foreign theater of battle, it appears that
the guns were purchased for protection from domestic threats from noncitizens and
others perceived as threats to the American citizenry.
Such incidences illustrate the persistence of the fear of both racialized and foreign
threats that have plagued the Republic from its inception to present day. The notion
that citizens may be under attack by noncitizens, especially when those noncitizens
are racially distinct from the majority of American citizenry, is so insinuated into pop-
ular discourse that it finds voice in legal doctrine, political debate, and legislation.
In the Federalist Papers, Madison’s response to the inevitability of potentially
dangerous factions was to “extend the sphere” of participation so that the deleterious
has been attempted many and many a time. In fact, in the last session
of the legislature such a bill was introduced and after it was called to
their attention that perhaps it may be unconstitutional, by the attorney
general’s office, then the bill was amended to include all persons. I feel
that all aliens, all persons, regardless of whether they’re citizens or
aliens, should be entitled to bear arms if it is under a reasonable restric-
tion and [if] it’s used for sportsmanship.
Id.
153 Id.; Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Sub-National Immigration Regulation and the Pursuit
of Cultural Cohesion, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1441, 1444 (2009).
154 Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After
September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
295, 340 (2002); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1580–
82 (2002).
155 Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post–September 11 Racial Violence as
Crimes of Passion, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1265–67 (2004). Similarly, in 1992, a Japanese
foreign exchange student was shot and killed by a white citizen in Louisiana. Although the
student was unarmed and searching for a Halloween party, the jury acquitted the citizen of
murder upon testimony that he felt endangered by the Japanese student. See Susan Michelle
Gerling, Louisiana’s New “Kill the Carjacker” Statute: Self-Defense or Instant Injustice?,
55 WASH. U. J. URBAN & CONTEMP. L. 109, 110 & n.8 (1999) (discussing Louisiana’s self-
defense statute).
156 Gun Sales Jump After September 11, CATO INST. (Nov. 6, 2001), http://www.cato.org
/dispatch/11-06-01d.html.
157 HENIGAN, supra note 120, at 3.
158 Ahmad, supra note 155, at 1261–62 (discussing post–9/11 increase in crime).
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effects of factions would be minimized.159 The hierarchical and individualist per-
spective (that calls for deregulation of firearms to counteract inherent human frailty)
understands firearms as Madison understood the political sphere. Just as “[a]mbition
must be made to counteract ambition,”160 greater disbursement of firearms is impor-
tant for citizen vigilance against violent factionalization.
Adopting this philosophy, at times even traditionally disfavored or disenfran-
chised groups clamor for greater firearm ownership to counteract the potential for
oppression from majority groups.161 Here again, the claims of groups such as reli-
gious and racial minorities, as well as women and gay persons,162 are based in an un-
derstanding of group qua group antipathy that can most effectively be contained by
an arms race designed to deter through mutually destructive firepower.163 While pro-
gressive in their call for democratized gun rights, these outgroup claims adopt the
hierarchical and individualistic perspective on the significance and utility of personal
armament as a solution to factionalization and interactions in a pluralist society.164
C. Gun Regulation and Noncitizens in the American Polity
Returning to Kahan and Braman’s typology, those with an egalitarian and soli-
daristic orientation prefer gun control.165 This policy preference stems from a cultural
orientation grounded in a belief that nonviolent collective action can and should
equalize differences in power, wealth, and status. But it is a worldview that also
requires significant trust in compatriots to participate in the project of collective so-
lutions to problems like public safety.166 As such, the prevalence of privately owned
firearms signals an unacceptable level of mistrust between persons who are bound
together in self-governance.167 For egalitarian gun control proponents, policies should
159 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
160 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 251–52 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003)
(discussing separation of powers and how the different branches will check each other’s
drive for power).
161 DAVID C. WILLIAMS, MYTHIC MEANINGS OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 220–57 (2003)
(discussing “Outgroups and the Second Amendment”); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T.
Diamond, The Second Amendment: Towards an Afro-Americanist Reconstruction, 80 GEO.
L.J. 309, 359–61 (1991); Winkler, supra note 89; see also infra Part II.
162 WILLIAMS, supra note 161, at 220–57; Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 161, at 359–61;
Alisa Solomon, Fired Up: Should Gays Carry Guns?, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 27, 1990, at 43;
Winkler, supra note 89; see also Note, Why Annie Can’t Get Her Gun: A Feminist Perspective
on the Second Amendment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 467 (arguing that firearms regulations have
a disparate impact on women, given threats to their safety posed by gendered violence).
163 WILLIAMS, supra note 161, at 221.
164 See id. (“[Outgroups] argue that the Second Amendment projects a social world frag-
mented into hostile identity groups; hence outgroup members need a personal right to arms.”).
165 Kahan & Braman, supra note 39, at 1297–98.
166 WILLIAMS, supra note 161, at 220.
167 Kahan & Braman, supra note 39, at 1317–18.
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signal trust in people, and because firearms are inherently dangerous, the overall limi-
tation in quantity of possessors and firearms is an appropriate policy goal.168 On this
view, gun restrictions should equitably affect all groups, whether citizen or noncit-
izen, racially marginalized or mainstream—as all persons from all groups must co-
exist and find public safety solutions in a pluralist society.169
Further, for egalitarians, shared institutions of collective action and self-govern-
ment are sufficient to mediate between factions. Then California Governor Ronald
Reagan—prior to the NRA endorsing his candidacy for president (and also prior to
the assassination attempt on him, which led to his endorsement of the federal Brady
Bill170)—captured this view when he signed a gun control bill into law, stating that
guns were a “ridiculous way to solve problems that have to be solved among people
of good will.”171 Based on this belief in the evolution of intergroup and interpersonal
interactions, egalitarians would maintain that removing a dangerous instrument from
private hands aids in the pursuit of a “more perfect union.”172 In contrast to the hier-
archical and individualistic outlooks, which worry about intergroup hostility with
the potential for armed violence, egalitarians might accept current or slightly ele-
vated violence and crime rates as the price of a civilized society.173
This perspective eschews the apocalyptic vision of the intergroup antipathist in
favor of one of a morally evolving conglomeration of persons who, in time, find alter-
natives to armed intergroup violence. Just as the deregulation movement can draw
from a rich historical and cultural library of movements, so does the call for increased
prohibitions on firearms. For example, after white posses used violence to suppress
new Black voters during the Reconstruction,174 the political process produced the
Fifteenth Amendment,175 Civil Rights Act,176 and Voting Rights Act.177 These enact-
ments arguably eliminate, or at least lessen, the need for armed minority group re-
sistance to secure political and civil liberties.178 In addition, egalitarians may argue
168 See id. at 1315–16.
169 Id. at 1318.
170 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2006); see Ronald Reagan, Why I’m for the Brady Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 29, 1991, at A23.
171 Winkler, supra note 89 (quoting Ronald Reagan). Of course, because Reagan’s state-
ment was made in the aftermath of the Black Panthers’ armed march on the state capitol, he
may have also been mixing his faith in solidaristic, non-violent solutions to collective prob-
lems, with a hierarchical view that disapproved of racial minority arms-bearing as a way of
securing greater civil and political rights.
172 See Kahan & Braman, supra note 39, at 1315–16.
173 Id.
174 See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 161, at 348.
175 U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
176 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
177 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2006).
178 See id.; The Effect of the Voting Rights Act, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
(2005), http://epic.org/privacy/voting/register/intro_c.html (noting exponential increase in
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that organized police forces only merged in the latter part of the nineteenth century.
On this view, local government authority intended to supplant private peacekeeping
obviates the need for armed self-defense.
Indeed, the Federalist Papers, while discussing the uniquely American “advan-
tage” of firearms, simultaneously appear to provide an implicit limitation on the
need for an armed American citizenry.179 Madison viewed noncitizens as potentially
threatening to republican institutions of the newly formed country because of their
inability to understand and value freedom and self-government.180 Complete gun
bans were the marks of oppressed foreign persons, or the symbol of domestic
enslavement—both noncitizens from places without self-government who were not
capable of understanding the American ethos of freedom and self-government.
Madison’s time, however, was bound by a world order in which monarchies
dominated the founders’ imagination.181 Since then, however, the European nations
of which Madison spoke have democratized,182 and the Civil Rights Amendments
ended chattel slavery in the United States.183 Because the American Republic is no
longer unique in its governance structure or its reliance on slavery, private individ-
uals need not use firearms either to preserve the idea of self-governance or to main-
tain coercive control over an enslaved population. Thus, it is conceivable that the
convergence of international governments to democratic and republican forms of
leadership temporally limits the reach of the Second Amendment generally, or the
exclusion of outgroups from its largesse.184
The evolution in the international order mirrors growth within certain Ameri-
can institutions as well. This change is typified by the California Supreme Court’s
voter registration among African Americans from 1965 to 1988). This does not mean that
racial minorities are adequately protected in the political process, but only that such leg-
islation showcases how non-violent means are available for redress. See, e.g., Nat’l Comm’n
on the Voting Rights Act, Protecting Minority Voters, LAWYERS’ COMM. CIV. RTS. (2006),
http://www.lawyerscommittee.org/admin/voting_rights/documents/files/0023.pdf.
179 THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 295–96 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
180 Id. at 296 (criticizing the monarchical and tyrannical governments of Europe for dis-
arming their citizens, and stating “it is not certain that with [firearms] alone they would not
be able to shake off their yokes”).
181 See, e.g., id. 
182 Daniel Griswold, Globalization, Human Rights, and Democracy, EJOURNAL USA, Feb. 1,
2006, at 40 (“[T]he percentage of the world’s governments that are democracies has reached
64 percent, the highest in the 33 years of Freedom House surveys.”).
183 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
184 Bogus, supra note 91, at 1374 (“[S]trong evidence suggests that the Southern states’
concerns about maintaining the militia for slave control, and the Northern states’ desires
to relieve the Southern states’ anxiety on the matter, were significant forces behind the
Second Amendment. From this perspective, the Second Amendment appears to be a remnant
from an era that ended in 1865 when the Thirteenth Amendment was enacted and slavery
was abolished.”).
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evolution from Ex Parte Rameriz185 in 1924 to People v. Rappard186 in 1972. Although
neither was a Second Amendment case, both opined on the constitutionality of non-
citizen gun possession and California’s alien-in-possession law.187 Rameriz upheld
the state’s ban on immigrant gun possession, expressly basing its conclusion on the
intrinsic dangerousness of immigrants.188 Yet, within a century, Rappard aban-
doned judicial reliance on pernicious group stereotypes regarding violence.189 Under
Rappard’s methodology, noncitizens were not reflexively treated as a dangerous
group requiring differential treatment from the citizen rather; the state could not dis-
criminate against immigrant gun rights without first articulating convincing reasons
for banning such possession.190 Because the state could not meet its burden, the court
struck down California’s alien-in-possession law. In doing so, Rappard accounts for
the significant changes in American population dynamics during the twentieth cen-
tury, caused by the repeal of racial and national origin prohibitions on immigration
and naturalization, and the increased inflows caused by World War II and the 1965
Immigration Act.191 At base, the opinion reflects the result of extended experience liv-
ing with and among racially distinct noncitizens. Accordingly, the Rappard court
based its ruling on the Equal Protection Clause, rather than the Second Amendment.192
One of the lessons of Rappard is about the nature of persons and the ability of a
republican society to adapt over time to demographic shifts. The gun itself, as an in-
strumentality, is the source of danger, not the characteristics of the group who might
possess it. Thus, the egalitarian view highlights very different symbols represented by
firearms than hierarchists or individualists. To egalitarians, the gun signifies a re-
gressive type of masculinity and cowboyism, ignorant of the ways in which a culture
of firearms undermines progress towards a more cohesive and peaceful populace.193
The ultimate goal for those who are attracted to collective solutions and reject
the permanency of intergroup warfare is gun control regardless of citizenship status.194
185 226 P. 914, 921–22 (Cal. 1924) (upholding constitutionality of a California law barring
“unnaturalized foreign-born persons” from possessing concealed weapons).
186 104 Cal. Rptr. 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (abrogating Rameriz and striking down the
State alien-in-possession law).
187 Rameriz, 226 P. at 917; Rappard, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 535.
188 Rameriz, 226 P. at 917 (“While such a danger [of armed noncitizens attacking the gov-
ernment] may seem improbable at the present time, yet, in time of war, it becomes a very real
danger indeed, particularly as a few thousand organized aliens . . . could so cripple our basic in-
dustries and our transportation facilities as to make us practically powerless in conducting war.”).
189 See Rappard, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 536–37 (rejecting the State’s insistence that Rameriz
should control).
190 Id. at 536–37.
191 See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS
AND POLICY 1–36 (7th ed. 2011) (providing a brief history of twentieth century immigration
law in the United States).
192 Rappard, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
193 Kahan & Braman, supra note 39, at 1300–02.
194 Gulasekaram, supra note 26, at 1568.
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The irony of the judicial transformation towards equality rationales from Rameriz
to Rappard is that it resulted in democratized gun possession by a larger pool of
persons;195 because noncitizens may not be more dangerous than the citizenry, no
compelling reason remains to limit noncitizen possession separate from citizen pos-
session. It is an equitable result, but not one that reduced the potential for personal
gun possession.
IV. CURRENT REGULATION OF NONCITIZENS AND FIREARMS
The intertwinement between cultural orientations towards firearm regulation and
citizenship, helps explain the current variations in alien gun laws in several states and
in federal firearms law.196 These laws would seem to survive constitutional muster
despite a Second Amendment recently reinvigorated by Heller and McDonald. In
those cases, the Court described the right to bear arms as one inuring to the benefit
of “citizens” and the “members of the political community,”197 thus preserving the
ability of governments to distinguish between citizens and noncitizens. Here, this
Article elucidates how various policy positions vis-à-vis citizenship and gun regu-
lation might arise in various states given the cultural orientations of constituencies
described in Part III. These policy positions in turn reflect compromises between
competing values and priorities within our constitutional order.
Both pro- and anti-control forces, when confronted with questions of citizenship,
equivocate between recognizing equality as operating regardless of citizenship status,
or equality as operating only within the confines of citizenship.198 Because group
claims to Second Amendment protection originate from factions other than majority
groups, the call for expanded gun rights can be democratizing. Accordingly, racial
minorities, religious minorities, women, and gays all have subfactions that have advo-
cated firearm possession as a method for equal dignity and rights.199 These out-group
arguments posit a threat of armed retaliation as the solution to persecution, and in
that way, tap into themes of equality and justice fundamental to the post–Civil War,
American legal and political identity.
Yet, even as gun ownership has been expanded, citizenship has, in many instances,
demarcated the limits of that expansion.200 The notion of noncitizens, including
195 Id. at 1565–66.
196 See Gulasekaram, supra note 21, at 895 nn.11–14 (categorizing States’ varying stat-
utory restrictions on gun ownership).
197 See Portillo-Munoz v. United States, 643 F.3d 437, 440 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1969 (2012) (citing “citizen” and “political community” language from Heller).
198 See, e.g., Weisberg, supra note 6, at 38–50 (discussing “consistency” in pro-gun and
anti-gun political positions).
199 See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text.
200 Cf. Kenneth A. Klukowski, Citizen Gun Rights: Incorporating the Second Amendment
Through the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 39 N.M. L. REV. 195, 247 (2009) (“Now in
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undocumented immigrants, utilizing firearms in a manner similar to other disfavored
groups is uncomfortable philosophical territory, causing one commentator to label
the idea “bizarre” and “extraordinarily troubling.”201 Even though intergroup vio-
lence might be endemic, foreigners generally, and racially distinct noncitizens spe-
cifically, are special outgroups that have occupied a unique position at the heart of
American paranoia.202
This final observation, then, brings to a head the dilemma of the gun advocate
at the nexus of citizenship and the right to bear arms. If the gun is a democratizing
and equalizing force, made necessary in a society with intergroup tension, it theoret-
ically should be available to all groups and persons. Yet, the discomfort with non-
citizen possession manifest in Supreme Court opinions and state and federal statutes
suggests that universality and equality have its limits.203 And so, gun rights remain
a hallmark of membership in the American polity because of their ability to demar-
cate and advantage citizens over noncitizens.204
The current variation in alien gun laws across the several states—with some
states with relatively stringent regulation regardless of citizenship status,205 others
with relatively lenient regulation regardless of citizenship status,206 and others with
relative regulation or prohibition of noncitizen possession compared to citizens’
gun privileges207—is indicative of these conflicting perspectives on both immigrants
and guns.
Some states that have enacted noncitizen firearm prohibitions are also states
with high noncitizen populations.208 For example, some heavily Democratic states
the Supreme Court’s sole examination of the Second Amendment, the Court speaks of it as
a right of citizens.”).
201 Id. at 238–39.
202 See, e.g., State v. Mendoza, 920 P.2d 357, 366–67 (Haw. 1996) (quoting Committee
of the Whole Rep. No. 5, in II PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
HAWAII OF 1950, at 14 (1961)); see supra Parts II.B–C.
203 See Gulasekaram, supra note 21, at 897.
204 It is worth noting that hierarchical and individualistic persons might part ways when
it comes to alien gun laws specifically; while individualistic perspectives would support
general deregulation, hierarchical ones might support alienage distinctions in gun laws, as
such classifications maintain traditional social priority ordering of citizens over noncitizens.
205 See, e.g., Brady Issues 2011 State Scorecard: California Rises Again, BRADY CAMPAIGN
TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, http://www.bradycampaign.org/media/press/view/1468/ (last
visited Dec. 6, 2012) [hereinafter State Scorecard] (ranking California as having the most
stringent gun laws in the United States).
206 See, e.g., id.
207 See Gulasekaram, supra note 21, at 895 nn.11–13 (listing Hawaii, Indiana, New
York, Arkansas, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, South Dakota,
Massachusetts, and Washington as states maintaining significant alienage distinctions in their
gun laws).
208 See, e.g., id. (ranking the gun laws of Massachusetts and New York); see also Gulase-
karam, supra note 21, at 895; Cristina Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 577 (2008).
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such as New York, are generally disposed towards ameliorative treatment of immi-
grants209 but also enact strict gun laws in an attempt to regulate firearms to the extent
permissible under federal and state constitutional guarantees.210 Meanwhile, other
states with alienage prohibitions in gun laws, such as Republican-heavy states like
Montana and South Dakota, have low immigrant populations211 and relative deregu-
lation of firearms for citizens.212 The fact that these demographically and politically
disparate states arrive at the same conclusion regarding alien gun possession sug-
gests the possibility of alternative rationales animating similar results.
To decipher these rationales, this section considers three general legislative
outcomes: (1) restrictive, even-handed gun regulation regardless of citizenship
status; (2) non-restrictive, even-handed non-regulation of guns regardless of citizen-
ship status; and (3) restrictive gun regulation for noncitizens, but relatively non-
restrictive gun regulation for citizens.213
A. Restrictive Regulation Regardless of Citizenship Status
Even-handed gun regulation irrespective of citizenship status is the most favored
policy goal of gun control proponents—egalitarians, who believe that private ar-
mament is both unnecessary and regressive.214 Taking a virtuous view of humans
interacting in a republican society, control proponents correlate the total quantity of
available firearms with the prevalence of violent and deadly incidents.215 The egali-
tarians’ dual commitments to collective action and equality lead them to prefer
blanket regulation to universal deregulation.
Axiomatically, this is the position most feared and ridiculed by gun control op-
ponents, who are most likely to be hierarchically and individualistically oriented.216
Broadly applicable firearms regulation clearly blunts the “advantage” extolled by
Madison in the Federalist Papers. To some gun advocates, the uniqueness of American
violence, both lawful and unlawful, and the role of guns in that violence, is itself a
virtue because these dynamics function to exceptionalize the United States.217 The
concern is not whether the gun-related violence is, on its own merits, a good or bad
policy outcome; rather, this critique of regulation posits that the ability to inflict
209 Rodriguez, supra note 208, at 577.
210 See State Scorecard, supra note 205.
211 See Gulasekaram, supra note 21, at 895 & n.11; Rodriguez, supra note 208, at 574–75.
212 See State Scorecard, supra note 205.
213 Obviously, this matrix could be completed with a fourth category for restrictive gun
regulation for citizens with relatively non-restrictive gun regulation for noncitizens. This
possibility is so far beyond constitutional, judicial, and public policy possibility that it does
not warrant further discussion.
214 See Kahan & Braman, supra note 39, at 1297–98.
215 See Weisberg, supra note 6, at 44–47.
216 See Kahan & Braman, supra note 39, at 1297–98; Weisberg, supra note 6, at 7.
217 See Weisberg, supra note 6, at 10–11.
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deadly violence and the corollary ability to endure deadly violence, are distinguish-
ing American traits.218 The ability to distinguish functions as its own virtue. Prohib-
iting citizens from owning firearms, then, chips away at the nation’s uniqueness and
consequently, the content of citizenship, making it a less substantively important
legal status.219
In addition, gun advocates vilify blanket firearms restrictions as reflecting
frailty.220 The idea that restriction is cowardly and weak—and thus un-American—
taps into deep-seeded folklore about the armed machismo that pervades the Ameri-
can ethos. As scholars like Robert Weisberg and James Jacobs have noted, various
theories regarding the culture of violence, the nature of the frontier, and the chivalry
of the South, have been proffered as justifications for the prevalence of guns and
gun violence in the United States.221 Until the Civil War, dueling with pistols was
officially sanctioned in a number of states.222 Limited to the white citizenry, and
complete with its own set of rules adopted from Europe and modified by the governor
of South Carolina, dueling acted as a form of alternative dispute resolution for a cer-
tain class of citizens.223 These uses of firearms were not only legal, but were cele-
brated as well.
B. Permissive Deregulation Regardless of Citizenship Status
The opposite end of the legislative spectrum—deregulation regardless of citize-
nship status (the result most favored by individualistic or libertarian viewpoints)224—
bolsters American firearm exceptionalism, while concurrently effecting the same
“devaluation” of citizenship status as blanket restrictions.225 As with complete reg-
ulation, citizens cannot distinguish themselves from noncitizens based on arms
rights in a fully deregulated scheme. While eschewing membership differentiations,
deregulation retains the benefit of preserving a distinctly American advantage.226 It
218 See id. at 21–35 (discussing “cultural explanations” for American violence); see also
Hofstadter, supra note 7 (discussing modern and historical attitudes toward gun control in
the United States).
219 Charles E. Roh, Jr. & Frank K. Upham, The Status of Aliens Under United States Draft
Laws, 13 HARV. INT’L L.J. 501, 501–02 (1972).
220 Kahan & Braman, supra note 39, at 1317–18; Slotkin, supra note 5, at 56–57.
221 Weisberg, supra note 6, at 12–17; JACOBS, supra note 6, at 17.
222 Dueling was known as “judicial combat” and the outcome of a duel could settle dis-
putes, including affronts to reputation and dignity. See The History of Dueling in America,
PBS AMERICAN EXPERIENCE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/duel/sfeature/dueling.html (last
visited Dec. 6, 2012).
223 Id.; Ross Drake, Duel!, SMITHSONIAN MAG., Mar. 2004, http://www.smithsonianmag
.com/history-archaeology/duel.html.
224 See Kahan & Braman, supra note 39, at 1307.
225 See Klukowski, supra note 200, at 219–20.
226 See Weisberg, supra note 6, at 10–11.
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neatly divides the American nation-state from other liberal democracies, providing
armed self-defense rights to all within the territorial jurisdiction.
Moreover, it allows the Hobbesian alarmist to tie gun rights to equity commit-
ments. Arming all against all is one way to redress the historical legacy immigrant,
Indian, and black disarmament, in efforts to render them second-class citizens. In
addition, equal armament comports with military service rules, which have long
allowed noncitizens to bear arms in prosecuting wars and have drafted noncitizens
during conscription.227 In this understanding, equal armament of noncitizens is the
cost gun advocates endure for their commitment to armed vigilance in a faction-
alized society.
Conversely, equitable non-regulation is the worst legislative outcome for gun
control proponents. On this view, the national distinctiveness achieved by deregula-
tion is a backwards-looking exceptionalism tied to a brutish past of constant inter-
group tension and a future of intractable interpersonal violence.228 While egalitarians
would support the recognition that violence is not endemic to certain peoples or
groups, they would bemoan the evolutionary stasis that the commitment that uni-
versal firearm availability symbolizes.229
C. Restrictive Regulation for Noncitizens, Deregulation for Citizens
The final legislative outcome vis-à-vis immigrants and guns—relatively free gun
rights for citizens with restrictions for noncitizens—ends up as the political compro-
mise in several states perhaps because it draws support from both gun rights advo-
cates and gun control proponents for widely disparate reasons. Unequal regulation
resulting in the disarming of noncitizens has considerable historical appeal, conjuring
a past of citizen vigilance against existential threats to person and nation posed by
outsiders to the revolutionary community,230 or by Indian savages on the frontier.231
It echoes the founding generation’s distrust and disarmament of British loyalists, and
the use of citizen militias to augment George Washington’s Continental Army.232
227 State v. Mendoza, 920 P.2d 357, 366–67 (Haw. 1996) (quoting Committee of the Whole
Rep. No. 5, in II PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII OF 1950,
at 10–15 (1961)); see Roh & Upham, supra note 219 (discussing the military’s willingness
to draft and employ noncitizens).
228 See Weisberg, supra note 6, at 14.
229 See id. at 21–35 (discussing the evolving cultural ethos in the United States).
230 See THE FEDERALIST No. 46 at 295–96 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
231 Riley, supra note 11, at 1681–83.
232 See Cornell & DeDino, supra note 2, at 506–07 (recounting eighteenth-century laws
conditioning firearms on loyalty oaths); Williams, supra note 85, at 885 (“In my view, it is
time to accept [that armed resistance in present-day America would be a civil war]; it is time
to stop conjuring with the idea of an organic American people, because that idea leads us in
the direction of the militias’ thinking—to the creation of an alien Other against whom we
could all be united.”).
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During the founding era, some states stripped gun rights from those who refused to
swear loyalty oaths to the emerging republic.233 And, during that same era, the militia
could be comprised of only citizens.234
Such heightened vigilance against outside or foreign threats appears heightened
again in our current historical moment. Post–9/11 terrorist threats to security have
been distinctly coded as foreign (and not domestic, like Timothy McVeigh),235 and
even threats to economic security during current recessionary times have elicited anti-
immigrant responses, like a rise in state and local immigration laws and restrictions
on student and worker visas. Recently, in a perverse facsimile of the Revolutionary
militia, the self-proclaimed Minutemen Civil Defense Corps attempted to rekindle
that same fervor, having tasked itself with aiding U.S. Customs and Immigration En-
forcement patrol of the Mexican border.236 Stationed in remote outposts in Arizona,
many of the Minutemen were former military or law enforcement personnel who
carried firearms during their border vigils.237 They literally perceived themselves as
protecting America from an existential threat posed by foreigners.238
But, this historical legacy is both a blessing and curse. While alienage distinctions
in gun laws may rekindle the revolutionary and founding ethic, the more extensive
legacy of citizenship and gun laws is far less noble.239 Linking guns to citizenship
status also strengthens the historic tie between firearms rights and violent oppression
on the basis of alienage, racial background, and national origin that has been a re-
curring theme in American history. Citizenship may be imbued with more exclusive
content when arms rights are limited to status citizens, but only when policy re-
gresses into less attractive parts of American history.240 The ugly linkage was most
explicit in Dred Scott, which understood “the people” of the Constitution to mean
only citizens, and “citizens” to include only white individuals.241 In the same vein,
early nineteenth-century alien-in-possession laws were based on the presumed sav-
agery and violent nature of immigrants.242
In addition to the historical problem, alien gun laws pose another, more practical
conundrum for gun advocates. Any type of regulation—even of noncitizens—is a
233 See, e.g., Cornell & DeDino, supra note 2, at 506.
234 An Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization, ch.3, §1, 1 Stat. 103 (1790),
repealed by Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, title I, subch. V, § 504, 54 Stat. 1172.
235 Williams, supra note 85, at 879–80.
236 David Holthouse, Minutemen, Other Anti-Immigrant Militia Groups Stake Out Arizona
Border, S. POVERTY L. CENTER (2005), http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence
-report/browse-all-issues/2005/summer/arizona-showdown (last visited Dec. 6, 2012).
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 See generally Gulasekaram, supra note 26, at 1542–61 (discussing “Race, Citizenship,
Xenophobia, and the Right to Bear Arms in the American Legal Narrative”).
240 Id.
241 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857), superseded by constitu-
tional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
242 Id.; KENNETT & ANDERSON, supra note 8, at 50.
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step towards greater firearm regulation. It is for this reason that those with individu-
alistic worldviews may part company with those gun advocates who hold hierarchi-
cal worldviews. For advocacy organizations like the NRA, an important argument
against virtually every type of regulation—even “cop-killer” bullets and assault rifle
regulations—has been to characterize each as a slippery slope towards more com-
plete governmental control.243 Likewise, any jurisdiction that requires proof of citi-
zenship status multiplies the transaction costs of procuring a firearm, and imposes
the obstacle of proving such status on citizens as well. In so doing, alien gun laws
contribute to a culture of augmented firearm regulation, including the normalization
of excluding entire groups from possession.244 The costs of alien gun laws might
worry some gun control opponents (especially individualistic/libertarian ones), even
when they concurrently believe in enhancing the substantive value of citizenship
and/or decreasing incentives for immigration.
Despite these difficulties, the discussion above explains why those who believe
in traditional power and social structures would support alienage restrictions in gun
laws, despite generally favoring firearm deregulation. But, even those who hold an
egalitarian outlook, and believe in the ability of a pluralist, republican society to
solve protection and anti-tyranny goals without private armament, may also accept
citizenship-dependent gun laws, but for different reasons than the gun control op-
ponent. For egalitarian gun control proponents, the inequity of restricting noncitizen
ownership is tolerated in service of a deeper societal, and constitutional, commit-
ment to collective, deliberative responses to both private and public threats.245 Dis-
armament of noncitizens qua noncitizens is regrettable, but acceptable; the restriction
is important because it reduces the eligible pool of gun owners and total firearms
possessed. Although not as attractive as comprehensive prohibitions, citizenship
distinctions are the next best, politically feasible alternative.
Heller leaves open the possibility that entire groups can be excluded from Second
Amendment protection, and specifically mentions two such groups—felons and those
with mental illness—in addition to its sub silentio protection of only citizens’ right
to bear arms.246
243 JACOBS, supra note 6, at 48–52. Counterintuitively, Heller actually appears to dampen
this well-worn NRA mantra by creating a firm stopping point for governmental regulation.
In essence, the polity can no longer slip down the slope to total disarmament. Accordingly,
in light of Heller, it might be possible to unequally regulate noncitizens without fearing ulti-
mate regulation of citizen possession.
244 See Gulasekaram, supra note 21, at 917–18.
245 See Kahan & Braman, supra note 39, at 1302.
246 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). Indeed, post-Heller laws
challenging the constitutionality of regulations on such groups have been upheld. See, e.g.,
Wilson v. State, 207 P.3d 565 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009) (citing Heller’s language in discussing
whether the Alaska Constitution’s right to bear arms provision prohibited statutes criminal-
izing felon firearm possession).
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A CONCLUSION: GUNS AND MEMBERSHIP IN THE AMERICAN POLITY
In researching the relationship between gun rights and questions of membership,
I feel much like Professor Sanford Levinson must have felt when he wrestled with
his own discomfort regarding judicial interpretations of the Second Amendment.247
In his law review article, he wrote about his attempts to square his views on firearms
regulation with his more expansive, individualistic understanding of other Bill of
Rights guarantees.248 He concluded that the Second Amendment was embarrassing
to liberals who maintained that it protected a collective right while relying on robust
individual interpretations of rights in other Amendments.249
Without endorsing his specific dilemma or conclusion, my foray into guns and
citizenship leads me to a similar quandary. I find my steadfast support of extensive
governmental regulation of firearms stymied by my correspondingly faithful dedica-
tion to expansive readings of “the people,” and equal protection guarantees for all per-
sons. I cannot claim to have peacefully reconciled these competing concerns. Equality
is a bivariate factor: both non-discriminatory prohibition and non-discriminatory
access are theoretically coherent from the perspective of equal treatment.250 And,
extensive deregulation of firearms across citizenship status may actually symbolize
greater inclusion of noncitizens in the American polity and lead to more robust
constitutional protection of noncitizens. Further, Heller’s fundamental premise regard-
ing armed self-defense might be understood to require choosing equal deregulation
across citizenship status.251
In the end, however, my belief that equality transcends citizenship status, com-
bined with my belief that the strength of our political institutions allows for delib-
erative, collective responses to both foreign and domestic threats, leads me to the
conclusion that most firearms laws—when regulating evenhandedly for all persons—
are reasonable, and consequently, constitutional.252
I detail my own struggle with competing commitments vis-à-vis gun control and
citizenship because I suspect that it is emblematic of a larger and deeper—and perhaps
247 Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 642 (1989).
248 Id. at 645.
249 Id. at 658. I note that hand-wringing and theoretical consistency issues are not uncommon
in Second Amendment scholarship. See also, e.g., Weisberg, supra note 6, at 38–50 (discussing
“consistency” in pro-gun and anti-gun political positions).
250 Cf. Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1394–95 (1988) (arguing that equality and rem-
edying racial bias could be understood in capital punishment cases like McCleskey to require
more executions of black criminals, rather than the abolition of the death penalty altogether).
251 Gulasekaram, supra note 26, at 1524.
252 I note here that Heller’s lack of an articulated standard for assessing Second Amend-
ment claims leaves this as a possible mode of judicial evaluation. See District of Columbia
v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2851 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting a lack of a judicial stan-
dard for evaluating Second Amendment claims).
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latent and mostly unvoiced—societal struggle with these same issues. If Professor
Levinson is correct in his assessment of liberal philosophies and the Second Amend-
ment, then those who hail Heller’s vision of the purpose of firearms and its exegesis
of “the people” should also be embarrassed.253 They support an expansive distribution
of a powerful instrumentality based on the importance of self-defense, yet limit ac-
cess to that tool to those who are formal members of the American polity. Even more
problematic, Heller and its progeny accomplish this exclusion with little or no ex-
planation.254 Accordingly, both this judicial ipse dixit and state statutory frameworks
that employ alienage distinctions in gun laws appear to represent a troubling and
undertheorized trend towards leaving immigrants outside the protection of our
Constitution’s liberties and increasing the chasm between citizens and noncitizens
without justification.255
Here, I have argued that gun rights and citizenship distinctions raise profound
questions about American identity and membership in the polity. These questions
are unlikely to be resolved by historical exegesis or constitutional interpretation. To
paraphrase the subtitle of Professor Tushnet’s book, Out of Range, the Constitution
alone can’t end the battle over guns or the meaning of “the people.”256 Indeed, this
Article began its inquiry with Tushnet’s critical observation that battles over gun
rights are battles over “who we are” as Americans. It concludes by proffering that
judicial limitations on “the people,” and the continued existence of immigrant gun
restrictions suggest that “we” still resist noncitizen inclusion and participation in the
polity. Moreover, “we” remain only partially committed to the constitutional goal
of equality, retreating from that vision when citizenship status becomes the dividing
line and when distribution of our uniquely American “advantage” is in question.
Finally, judicial interpretations of the Second Amendment and alienage distinctions
in gun laws show that, while sometimes extolling the virtues of firearm possession,
“we” still understand why it’s a distinctly dangerous instrumentality in private
hands.257 The gun in America is unique because it has defined, and will continue to
define, membership and belonging in the polity.
253 Id. at 2790–91 (majority opinion); Levinson, supra note 247, at 638–44.
254 Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783; McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (holding that
the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is applicable against states and localities
by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment).
255 See generally Gulasekaram, supra note 26.
256 TUSHNET, supra note 37.
257 See, e.g., Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783; State v. Mendoza, 920 P.2d 357, 366–67 (Haw. 1996)
(quoting Committee of the Whole Rep. No. 5, in II PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF HAWAII OF 1950, at 10–15 (1961)).
